Available data suggest that the influence and autonomy o f health care professionals have been declining. O f course, professional impact remains higher in health care than perhaps any other economic sphere, but the locus o f much health care decision making has been shifting from independent professionals to employed personnel o f large-scale governmental, hospital, insurance, and research organizations. The question therefore arises as to what shall replace this previous reliance upon in dividual professional ethics to assure the society that its newly powerful health care organizations are functioning in a desirable manner. In other words, what are to be the preferred mechanisms fo r socially controlling health care organizations. This paper traces three dominant belief patterns about how the characteristics of health care organizations and their environments produce desired control. It proposes that belief patterns have emphasized (1) the non-profit motives o f many health care organizations; (2) the system o f interrelationships that surround health care organizations; and (3) the vast differences among health care consumers. Choices from among these models continue to depend less upon knowledge o f organizational functioning than upon political dispositions and social fancy.
research) accounting for more than one-half o f all expenditures. Furthermore, the immense power of physicians and other professionals in these organizations had been somewhat weakened while the power of administration had increased, particularly in hospitals (Perrow, 1961; White, 1971) . Health care organizations and their administrative structures were becoming the focus of planning, decision making, sanctioning, and much else in health care.
Because of this ongoing shift, there developed a need to change assumptions about motivations and controls in the health care field. The tradition of professional motivation to serve clients could less and less be relied upon as a way to assure laymen that medical institutions function " properly." Patient-oriented pro fessionals do not control medical organizations; organizationally oriented employees do. Unfortunately, however, little is un derstood about circumstances that would encourage the elites of health care organizations to provide quality care at reasonable prices.
Social Control of Medical Organizations
The health care field is not unique in its failure to understand the control of organizational activities. Public inability to control cor porate political contributions and CIA domestic spying, as well as the nearly universal failure of federal regulatory agencies, are just a few illustrations that available technology for external control of organizational actions is weak in many areas. Little is known about how organizations can be controlled. In a controversial area such as health care, this lack of knowledge leaves a costly vacuum where strategies for control reflect little more than the political and social predispositions of their advocates (see Reinhardt, 1973) . But, as illustrated by experiences with Blue Cross, Medicare, and Com prehensive Health Planning, the usefulness of these predispositions has not been affirmed by experience. Control has been difficult to obtain, and health care organizations have proven more com plicated and intractable than expected, with narrow organizational interests regularly undermining outsider preferences. For instance, while it may be rational for a hospital to abandon an emergency room or purchase open-heart surgery facilities, this may not be desired by concerned outsiders. Hospitals nevertheless continue to buy unneeded technology and companies continue to sell it.
These behaviors are sociologically defined as deviant; they are contrary to the standards and expectations defined by important groups in society. However, incomplete knowledge about the relationship between these deviant organizational behaviors and the societal responses to them results in fostering behaviors that are neither intended nor immediately obvious (Ermann and Lundman, 1975) . This tendency prompted Somers (1969:ix) in her excellent book on hospital regulation, to observe succinctly that hospitals so far have " defied conventional public regulation''; despite past failures, or perhaps because of them, the search for organizational knowledge and regulatory technology has continued.
Models of Behavior and Control of Medical Organizations
This paper analyzes changing models of organizational behavior and control in the health care field. It argues that these models, in their times, have been used by the public and by elites (1) to describe the internal dynamics of medical organizations, and (2) to prescribe the conditions that should exist to encourage medical organizations to perform in socially desired ways. Though the models are not mutually exclusive in theory, an emphasis on one has tended to be accompanied by relegation of the others. The models, like the conceptual scheme used here to describe them, are of necessity crude because of the recent importance of large medical organizations and the resulting newness of the need to con trol them. When applied, these models have enjoyed little suc cess-partly as a result of problems of their unstated and therefore untested nature which we will here try to remedy.
Available data suggest three partly overlapping stages of American beliefs about how medical organizations operate. The first model stressed that the non-profit status of most hospitals and some other medical care organizations makes them substantially immune from corruption of their health care goals. Conversely, it assumed that the profit motive in medicine has a powerful corrup ting influence. The second model emphasized systemic ties o f hospitals to a wide range of organizations in their environments. It implied that connections, exchanges, and coordination involving health organizations are the most important constraints on their performance. The third and most recent model, just now emerging, emphasizes the impact of the immediate environment of medical organizations. It proposes that the idiosyncratic differences among health care recipients are or should be the major determinants of the performance of medical care organizations. These three models have remarkably different implications for choices regarding how hospitals and other medical organizations are to be controlled. Each will be analyzed in detail in the following sections.
The Non-Profit Motivation Model
The non-profit motivation model, which has had the longest history and probably the most influence of any model, emphasized distinctions between profit-making and non-profit organizations. It placed great emphasis on the altruistic goals of formally non profit organizations (Lentz, 1956 ) and on the parallel unworthiness of those that seek " to make profit from the suffering of others." Because this model accepted the official service goals of non-profit organizations, and because it has been influential, attempts to con trol non-profit medical organizations until recently have been minimal. Why, it was asked, should we regulate organizations whose only goals are public service? The description below shows that the answer to this question in the case of voluntary hospitals and Blue Cross often was that they need not be regulated.
Voluntary hospitals for a long time escaped common law and legislated controls, such as a financial penalty for poor per formance, applied to most other organizations. % medically related organizations were given special treatment-and subjected to relatively loose control-because they were deemed to be non-profit. By comparison, the level of control of proprietary hospitals and commercial insurance companies has been high, partly because of low legitimacy of commercialism in these areas. Proprietary hospitals always have been subject to malpractice suits, labor legislation, and regular taxation. Commercial insurance companies have been regulated by state insurance commissioners for more than 100 years (Kulp and Hall, 1968:958-959). They were not given special treatment for their involvements in health care.
The level of regulation of these medical businesses appears to change in concert with regulatory trends in the society. When the regulatory movement in the general economy is in a laissez-faire direction and controls on businesses are being loosened, healthrelated businesses also have their controls lessened. At other times medical businesses join non-medical businesses in being closely regulated.
American public opinion appears to be in a period of in creasing distrust of commercial organizations, growing desires to control them, and decreasing support for laissez-faire economics-and these attitudes are carrying over into the medical field. Recent studies o f nursing care facilities and their failures, for example, have focused on the need to control the medical practices, as well as the high profits, of commercial nursing homes. A Senate report (U.S. Senate, 1974:225) on " Profits and the Nursing Home: Incentives in Favor of Poor Care" quoted a Dr. Butler expressing this focus quite clearly:
After 15 years of research and practice, I come now to believe that the profit motive must be eliminated from our care systems in cluding medicine and institutional care and its alternatives. There are many fine and well-intentioned nursing home owners. They are not all miscreants... But the conflict between profit and service is too great to overcome.
Only in the United States and Canada (to my knowledge) is there ' 'commercialization... ' '
The report itself, as well as its title, placed its authors with Dr. Butler among the critics of profit-making nursing homes.
The non-profit motivation model, in sum, presumes dif ferential need to control health care organizations based on a single Spring 1976 / Health and Society / M M F Q criterion-whether they officially seek a profit. Those orga nizations holding official non-profit goals tend to be less controlled than profit-making organizations engaged in similar activity. In health care sectors where non-profit organizations account for much activity (e.g., hospitals and insurance), emphasizing this dimension has resulted in low levels o f societal control.
The Systemic Model
The systemic model has been replacing the profit motivation model in American regulatory imagery. Unlike its predecessor, the systemic model as applied to health and other fields does not focus on internal (profit-related) motives; rather, it focuses on external relations with other organizations.
This systemic approach when applied to health problems em phasizes that all hospitals (whether voluntary or proprietary) buy from commercial pharmaceutical firms, that non-profit Blue Cross is disbursing agent for the government's Medicare program to proprietary hospitals, and that university-based research centers rely on federal funding. The systemic approach is unconcerned with adjectives like " profit-making," " voluntary," or " govern mental." It emphasizes instead how organizations interconnect (Levine and White, 1961). Its current popularity is evident in the widely used phrases like " health care delivery systems" and the "chaos" of the " health care non-system." The word " system" in particular is emphasized. ...What is needed is a drastic restructuring of the medical system. The federal government, which is paying a sizable share of present medical costs, should encourage the establishment of more efficient systems of medical care, particularly group-practice plans....Also private insurance companies should begin challenging high medical costs more firmly... Three of the six most important national health insurance bills introduced into the recent Ninety-third Congress share wholehear tedly the assumptions of the systemic model. They postulate that health care is a system of interrelated parts, and that the parts' relations with one another should be altered. They differ about what relationships should be altered, which is not surprising given their divergent support, but they agree on the need for alterations. The Senate sponsor of the strongest and best known of them, the Kennedy-Griffiths bill supported by organized labor, made these assumptions perfectly clear in his introduction to the bill (Kennedy, 1973:1) ...The history of medicare and medicaid has taught us that attempts to offer health insurance on a piecemeal basis to segments of our population-without major efforts to expand and reform our health care system-result in increased inflation which robs Americans of much of the benefit of the new insurance....The answer to this problem is not to cut back on benefits, to raise insurance premiums even more, or to simply offer more insurance to more Americans. The answer is to reform our health care system and bring these costs under control. The failure of CHP may be due more to the accuracy of the systemic model and its assumptions than to their inadequacy. The model correctly avoids superficial assumptions that non-profit organizations which fail to serve the public will change their behaviors readily in order to serve, and that profit-making organizations will change to protect or enhance profits. It em phasizes instead that organizations tend toward stability and autonomy because of the constraints of other organizations with which they interact. As a result, medical organizations often resist external forces trying to disrupt their existing patterns-to the im mense frustration of critics. The following criticism of reforms (Alford, 1972:128) vividly summarizes the frustrations (and the assumptions) of the systemic model:
Control of medical organizations under Kennedy-Griffiths rests
...The overwhelming fact about the various reforms of the health system that have been implemented or proposed-more money, more subsidy of insurance, more manpower, more demonstration projects, more clinics-is that they are absorbed into a system which is enormously resistant to change. The reforms which are suggested are sponsored by different elements in the health system and ad vantage one or another element, but they do not seriously damage any interest. This pluralistic balancing of costs and benefits suc cessfully shields the funding, powers, and resources of the producing institutions from any basic structural change.
This disillusionment with the systemic approach is un derstandable when one considers American health-planning ex periences to date, and basic American attitudes toward planning. American distrust of planning runs deep and strong. George Wallace had little difficulty finding audiences sympathetic to his at tacks on pointy-headed bureaucrats who plan other people's lives; calls for reduced governmental planning gain support at all points of the political continuum on all types of issues.
Despite these misgivings (engendered by recent experiences and anti-planning biases), the systemic model has enjoyed popularity among health care professionals because it is consistent with many of the growing technical and scientific subcultures within American society. Management information systems, operations research, and inventory control are just a few instances of this approach in business. In the social sciences, econometric modeling and interorganization studies have gained popularity more recently. As can be seen by the statements from Fortune and Senator Kennedy, use of the systemic approach in other areas has provided powerful imagery for the systemic models of health care.
In sum, the systemic model's emphasis on interconnections is being challenged because it creates frustration and distrust. Frustration results from the accuracy of the model's emphasis on interconnections that inhibit change, as well as from the failure of legislation based on systemic approaches. Distrust by a large segment of American society results from the model's implication of large-scale government planning.
The Idiosyncratic Needs Model
More consonant with current American beliefs than the systemic model is a model that emphasizes the peculiar, idiosyncratic nature of the geographic, racial, class, age, and other categories of health care recipients. Focusing on differences between categories, this model deemphasizes the interconnections among (and profit making traits of) health care providers. Instead, it implies that the differences between black urban ghettos, rural backwaters, and suburban sprawls are more important than similarities-so their health care organizations must be different and locally controlled. Preferably these organizations would be controlled by those being served, because centralized planning and controlling agencies, even when they attempt to be flexible, are seen as incapable of serving such a wide divergence of health care needs. With its emphasis on diversity and decentralization, this model, not surprisingly, is useful to a number of groups.
First, as used by those on the political left, differences in needs require local " community control" of health care so that the special interests of consumers, particularly the downtrodden, can be asserted and protected. The American Health Empire (Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich, 1971 ), a well-received critique of American health care, makes essentially this case when it argues that health care presently is controlled by and serves profitable commerical ventures and uncaring hospital leaderships. But health care could be consumer-controlled, the book suggests. The final chapter is entitled, " The Community Revolt: Rising Up Angry," and expresses belief in a community's ability to deal with a neigh borhood health center it so far had been unable to control. " With literally a century of struggle behind it, the lower east side com munity is too old and too experienced to be discouraged by one short skirmish" (Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich, 1971: 279). The book illustrates that the idiosyncratic needs model, as implemented by the political left, assumes communities have relatively homogeneous needs which (1) differ from the needs of other com munities, and (2) should and can be served.
In Second, as used by the political right, the model directs more attention to individual differences and less to group differences. Consistent with classical economics, this use of the idiosyncratic model would permit each individual to purchase the services that his own peculiar configuration of needs dictates. The American Medical Association's national health insurance proposal, " Medicredit," is in this category. It implies that the nation's most significant health care problem is paying health insurance premiums, and proposes little more than federally subsidized op tional private insurance so that individual citizens can buy the par ticular configurations of health care they desire.
Finally, as used by health care administrators, the idiosyn cratic model discards the bad old days when local differences were ignored in favor of formulas applicable to a wide range of cases (e.g., Hill-Burton had a small number of population-to-hospital ratios applied over a broad array of circumstances). Somers In sum, although no version of the idiosyncratic-needs model has been widely accepted, the model nonetheless is attractive to a diversity of political and professional groups because it has com ponents they share. It advocates a decentralized control system, consumer choices, and the avoidance of " big brother," all of which makes it appealing in American culture. Consequently, it ap pears to be gaining attractiveness in the general society as "think small" becomes desirable, and as sentiment among citizens and leaders grows against bigness in government and commerce. (Even pornography is now legally definable by community idiosyn crasies.) In health, once the controversy over national health in surance is resolved, this " back to the roots" movement may enter with full force. This model may be attractive enough to dominate future health care control decisions.
The Sociological Imagination and the Social Control of Medical Organizations
This paper has attempted to clarify the alternative ways Americans have gone about modeling the increasingly apparent problems of controlling their powerful health care organizations. It has argued that American thought gradually has been abandoning profit as a prime explanatory variable in many areas and moving toward the idea of a system. Now, as nostalgia for simpler days is gaining strength, as large institutions generally are falling into disfavor, and as sexual, age, and ethnic groups are asserting their distin guishing traits, health beliefs and preferences are discouraging bureaucratic impersonality and efficiency in favor of the charms of group differences.
The changing health attitudes described here parallel Charles Reich's (1970) interesting but overstated description of the se quence of " world views" held by Americans. Reich's categories can be seen as the larger context for the sequence of views on con trolling medical care organizations described here. " Consciousness I," the earliest of the world views, belonged to the small business men, farmers, and pioneers whose life experiences taught them that man's natural condition is to struggle. " One worked for oneself, not for society. But enough individual work made the wheels turn" (Reich, 1970:22). Some people were profit-motivated, others were not.
" Consciousness II," the replacement for " Consciousness I," belongs to those whose most compelling experiences were with the interdependences and interconnections of large organizations, and who came to believe that organized rationality is man's most necessary state. And, finally, Reich's " Consciousness III" is held by an emerging group who seek a stronger respect for people. " In place of the world seen as a jungle, with every man for himself (Consciousness I), or the world seen as a meritocracy leading to a great corporate hierarchy of rigidly drawn relations...(Con sciousness II), the world [of Consciousness III] is community" (Reich, 1970:227).
Beliefs of health care leaders, like those of laymen, are in fluenced by societal trends and fancies. These changing social at titudes in general could have unfortunate consequences for health care organizations if applied indiscriminately in the health field. This writer believes that there may be unfortunate consequences if social trends lead to wholesale acceptance o f the idiosyncratic model. While many of the most noticeable American medical care problems are visible at the community level, their roots lie deeper in the social structure. Attracting health personnel from affluent suburbs to urban ghettos and poor rural regions, for example, can not be accomplished by the poor communities; a mechanism en compassing the relative surplus and shortage communities is needed. Medical care requires resources that are spread throughout the society, resources that cannot be mobilized locally but must be organized regionally or nationally.
Similarly, hospitals are in a national nexus of government programs, commercial manufacturers, insurance organizations, and professional associations. The growth of this system has out stripped Americans' understanding of necessary circumstances for health care organizations to provide reasonably priced high-quality care. As Mills (1959:3) noted, " the more aware [people] become, however vaguely, of ambitions and of the threats which transcend their immediate locales, the more trapped they seem to feel." The idiosyncratic model in health care may turn out to offer a false road to losing the sensation of being trapped and powerless.
It would be unfortunate to end this paper defending the systemic model, however, because the goal of this paper has not been to boost one model and disparage others. Convincing data for doing this are unavailable in any case. The goal, rather, has been to draw attention to the need to understand and make explicit the models proposed for controlling increasingly dominant or ganizations in American health care. Professional responsibility will not work because professionals, even when they happen to be client-oriented, do not control medical organizations. What is needed in the health care area is organizational control knowledge as the basis for developing organizational control technologies. Current technology, in the absence of knowledge, has become an offshoot of idiology and popular culture. 
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